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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ; 
vs. \ 
JAMES S. BINGHAM, a 
Defendant-Appellant, : 
: Case No. 860292 
\ Argument Priority 
i Classification # 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in finding 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant for possession of a 
controlled substance? 
II. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in finding 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant for possession with 
the intent to distribute for value? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 30, 1984, defendant, James C. Bingham, and three 
friends were traveling south on University Avenue in Provo, Utah. 
At that same time and location, Officer Webber of the Provo 
Police Department noticed defendant's vehicle traveling at, what 
he considered a high rate of speed (R. 140)• Officer Webber 
pursued the vehicle and pulled it over at approximately 3700 
North University Avenue (R. 140). 
At that time, Officer Webber requested the assistance of 
Officer Long, also of the Provo Police Department (R. 191). 
Officer Webber then approached the vehicle, as he did so he 
thought he could smell alcohol coming therefrom (R. 140). 
Officer Webber ordered the defendant out of the car and proceeded 
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to issue an alcohol field test. While the field test was being 
conducted, assisting Officer Long conducted a search of the 
vehicle. Officer Long noticed a package of Zig-Zag rolling 
papers on the floor of the vehicle (R.155). This, arrousing his 
suspicionf prompted him to search the glove-box. Upon doing so, 
Officer Long located and confiscated a baggie containing one 
ounce of marijuana, a set of scales and a bundle of empty plastic 
bags (R. 142, 147, 148, 157). 
At this point in time, Officer Webber read the defendant his 
rights (R. 142). Officer Long then asked the defendant if he 
could look in the trunk of the vehicle. Defendant readily gave 
permission to do so (R. 142,159). The search of the trunk 
produced a green, canvas saddle bag containing 16 seperate 1/4 
ounce plastic containers of marijuana (R. 144, 145, 159). The 
Defendant informed, the officers, that the automobile was not 
his. He had intended to buy it but had not yet been able to 
do so (R. 150, 160). 
A search of the defendant's person was then conducted and a 
small prescription bottle containing a few marijuana seeds was 
confiscated (R. 147). The defendant was placed under arrest and 
charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute for value. One of the other male 
co-occupants was also arrested because of his intoxicated state, 
while the other two co-occupants were released without further 
questioning (R. 142-144, 150). 
On the 21st day of April 1986, defendant was tried by jury 
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and found guilty of the crime charged (R. 104). Subsequently, 
notice of appeal was filed in the Utah County Clerk's Office on 
May 30th, 1986 (R. 115). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by finding that 
the State had produced sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant for possession of marijuana. The defendant was 
accompanied by three other individuals, all of which could have 
owned the marijuana. Also, the defendant stated that the 
automobile was not his, he was merely trying to buy it. 
Therefore, the marijuana and related paraphernalia could have 
been the owner's, indicating the defendant and other occupants 
were not aware of its presense. 
The trial court further erred prejudicially by finding the 
state's evidence sufficient to convict the defendant of 
possession with intent to distribute for value. The defendant 
had no knowledge of the marijuana located in the glove-box or the 
trunk. Defendant's only link to the crime was his driving 
another's vehicle which contained marijuana as well as three 
other suspects, and his possession of a medicine bottle 
containing a few marijuana seeds, which could hardly be 
considered a saleable quantity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE STATE HAD PRODUCED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT FOR POSSES-
SION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
According to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(2)(i) of the Utah Code 
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Annotated, it shall be unlawful, "For any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance,••." 
(Emphasis added) In order for the state to convict the defendant 
for possession of the large quantities of marijuana confiscated 
from the automobile they must prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the defendant knew the marijuana was in the vehicle and also that 
the defendant intended for it to be there. 
The State's only evidence is the confiscated marijuana and 
related paraphernalia and also the fact that the defendant was 
driving the automobile from which the evidence was taken. 
However, the defendant did not own the vehicle, and he was 
accompanied by three other individuals (R. 149, 150, 163). The 
state has offered no proof to link the marijuana directly to the 
defendant, the conviction rests on the assumption that because 
the defendant was in control of the automobile be owned all 
articles therein* 
Two cases have been decided by the Utah Supreme Court which 
are factually similar to the case at hand, and therefore may 
assist in the Court's decision. The first case is State vs. 
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah, 1983)(R. 234). In Anderton, a 
search of the Anderton premises was conducted by police officers 
and several items of marijuana and related paraphernalia, 
including growing plants, were found in the residence. Mr. 
Anderton claimed the marijuana and paraphernalia were all his, 
that he alone had brought them into the home, and that his wife 
had no knowledge about it. The court held that Mrs. Anderton1s 
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cotenancy of the premises containing the drugs cannot cause an 
inferrance that she was aware of such drugs, without further 
incriminating statements or circumstances to establish such an 
inferrence. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's 
conviction of Mrs* Anderton (R. 234, 235). 
Comparing Anderton to the case at hand one finds several 
similarities. The defendant, like Mrs. Anderton, did not own the 
premises from which the drugs were confiscated. The defendant 
was only test driving the automobile with the intent of soon 
purchasing it (R. 150) • The drugs found therein could have 
belonged to the owner of the automobile or one of the three 
co-occupants. If the drugs belonged to the owner, then one can 
reasonably assume, as in Anderton, that the defendant or his 
co-occupants had no knowledge of the drugs therein. According to 
Anderton, "The accepted standard of appellant review permits the 
Court to overturn a conviction only when it is made to appear 
that reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt of 
guilt." Id. at 1262. Under these facts, reasonable minds could 
surely entertain the idea that the defendant was driving 
another's vehicle and had no idea that the owner was keeping 
illegal drugs hidden throughout the automobile, especially when 
there are no other incriminating statements or circumstances to 
prove otherwise. 
However, if the drugs were owned by one of the co-occupants 
of the vehicle, then the defendant would be more likely to have 
knowledge thereof. According to Anderton, knowledge of the 
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presense of drugs is an incriminating circumsance. The knowledge 
issue is further addressed by the subsequent case of State vs, 
Fox, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1985)(R. 235) . The Fox case is also 
factually similar to the case at hand. Peace officers in Weber 
County obtained a search warrant to search a residence occupied 
by Gary and Clive Fox. The residence had two bedrooms; Gary's 
room contained incriminating evidence while Clive's room did not. 
The kitchen contained marijuana and other related paraphernalia, and 
two green houses attached to the home both contained marijuana 
plants. The Court found that both defendants lived in or 
occupied the home and convicted them for production of a 
controlled substance and possession with intent to distribute for 
value. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of 
Gary Fox, who was found to be the owner of the premises, and in 
whose bedroom incriminating paraphernalia and a pamphlet were 
found. The Court however, reversed the conviction of Clive Fox, 
finding that although he had knowledge of the existence of 
marijuana on the premises, mere knowledge is not the equivalent 
of constructive possession and there was insufficient evidence to 
raise a reasonable inference that Clive Fox was engaged in 
Criminal activity and not merely a bystander (R. 235, 236). 
Turning to the case at hand, the defendant denies any 
knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle. But even if the defendant 
knew the drugs were there, there is no evidence raising a 
reasonable inference that the defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity. The Fox case states: 
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Persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit 
drugs and who might even have access to them, but who 
have no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not be 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance. 
Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession 
where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that 
knowledge and ability. 
To find that a defendant had constructive possession 
of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary to prove 
that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused 
and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had 
both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over the drug. Id at 9. 
The defendant would therefore have to be considered a mere 
bystander and according to the quote above, a knowledgable 
bystander does not equal constructive possession. 
For the above reasons, the defendfant's guilt as to 
possession of the large quantity of marijuana found in the 
automobile should be reversed. Concerning the few 
marijuana seeds found in a medicine bottle in defendant's pocket, 
defendant admits to having knowledge of the bottle, but not its 
contents. Defendant was given the prescription bottle by one of 
the co-occupants, Mrs. Smith, who asked defendant to check if it 
could be refilled. Defendant was unaware of the contents of the 
bottle upon taking possession of it. (R. 223-225). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE STATE HAD PRODUCED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT FOR POSSES-
SION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE. 
Even if the Supreme Count can find sufficient evidence to 
establish a conviction for possession, the trial court's evidence 
establishing an intent to distribute for value will be considered 
insufficient. As described above, the only marijuana that the 
defendant actually possessed was the few seeds found in the 
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medicine bottle confiscated from defendants person. Those few 
seeds can hardly be considered a saleable quantity. The Fox cate 
comments on the criteria for a conviction of of possession with 
intent to distribute for valuef the Court states: 
A conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute requires proof of two elements: 
(1) That the defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed a controlled substance, and (2) that the 
defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance 
to another. Id at 9. 
As previously stated, the defendant was unaware of the seeds in 
the medicine bottle as well as the other quantities of marijuana 
found in the car. A person ignorant of the presence of a 
controlled substance can hardly be considered as having the 
intent of selling it. 
The State's only evidence at the trial court level concerning 
the intent to distribute was the quantity of marijuana, the small 
plastic containers, and the scales. This is sufficient evidence 
for a conviction of distribution if the evidence can be linked to 
the defendant. However, the evidence has in no way been linked 
to the defendant; in fact, it is more logical that the defendant 
truely was unaware of the contents of the glove box and the 
trunk. For instance/ if the defendant had known about the large 
quantity of marijuana, why would he be so willing to allow the 
officer to search the trunk? Defendant knew he could refuse to 
allow the search since the officer had asked him for permission. 
Instead of refusing however, he readily allowed the search (R. 
142, 143, 150). If the defendant had been aware of what was in 
the trunk, he surely would have denied the officer's request for 
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a search of it. It simply is more sensible that the defendant 
was only test driving the car, unaware of its contents* VJhen he 
was pulled over he knew he was in trouble for driving and 
drinking, so he felt it would be in his best interest to 
accomodate the police in any way possible. Defendant was 
completely unaware that being so accomodating would only increase 
his troubles. 
If the Court finds that the defendant was unaware of the 
marijuana and related paraphernalia in the car, then, according 
to Anderton (supra), the Court should reverse the trial court's 
conviction of intent to distribute for value, since the only 
marijuana possessed was the unsaleable quantity found in the 
medicine bottle. If the Court finds that the defendant was aware 
of the marijuana in the vehicle, but had no intent to obtain or 
use the drugs, then, according to Fox (supra), the Court should 
likewise reverse the lower court's decision for the same reasons. 
However, if the Court finds that the State has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant was aware of the drugs, and 
intended to use them and sell them, then the lower court's 
conviction should stand* 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for possession 
with intent to distribute for value pertaining to the marijuana 
and related paraphernalia confiscated from the automobile which 
defendant was driving and also from defendant's person. 
Defendant respectfully contends that the trial court erred in 
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finding the State had produced sufficient evidence for such a 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this Of Cl^jyUyiA. , 1986, 
tflj-ysf J/- ^e^^kkr 
. "WFlGHT XT' 
Attorney/for Defendant-Appellant 
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